resume lecture of Fanaee

Resume of Dr M. Fanaei Eshkevari on MA Lecturing on Comparative Epistemology and Critical Approach to Islamic Philosophy

By Nano Warno (Salman Fadhlullah)

Comparative Epistemology

Philosophy is method of thinking, rational thinking, or we can say meta-philosophy. The first philosophy is branch of philosophy. The object of first philosophy is being qua being. Although being is encompasses everything but here is only common aspect of being or distinctive being, or common feature of being. The first philosophy or Metaphysics a branch of philosophy concerned with being, first principles, and often including aspects of cosmology and epistemology. Starting point of Theology as well as philosophy is reason. Reason as important as text.

Ilmu Hudhuri (knowledge by Presence)

etika aristoteles

Eidos and Energeia

By Nano Warno

The hallmark of Aristotle as a philosopher is a robust common sense, which refused to believe that this world was anything but fully real. Philosophy, as it appeared to him,was an attempt to explain the natural world. And if it could not do so, or could explain it only by the introduction of a mysterious, transcendental pattern-world, devoid of the characteristically natural property of motion, then it must be consideren have to fail. His comment on the Platonic Ideas is typical :But to call them patterns, or speak of the other things as sharing in them,is to talk in empty words and poetic metaphors.

Aristotle was more builder than a visionary. He looked for solid foundations in the physical and social order and developed logic to guide his scientific elaboration. To put strength in the resulting intellectual structure, he fixed each part in its place with firm bends of principle and cause (Ancient Western Philosophy. The Hellenic Emergence Geoerge F. Mc Mclean and PAtric J. Aspell)

Kamus Pribadi

(key words dari terjemahan dan saduran dari beberapa paper tentang epistemologi Shadra dari mullashadra.org)

Kata shadra kontradiksi selain harus memenuhi 8 syarat kesatuan (wahdah) juga harus ditambah dengan wahdah dalam haml (predikat); baik haml dzati atau haml syina;.

wujud dzihni (mental existence)

Ketika jauhar atau ardh external ‘memasuki pikiran/mental/dzihni’ maka jauhar atau ardh itu akan kehilangan unsur externalnya disini bisa dilihat dua haml (predikasi) yang berbeda : 1.wujud mental dari sisi mahiyat secara dzati memiliki kesatuan (wahdat) dengan wujud khariji, sehingga bisa diatributkan (haml) haml dzati dan awali 2. tapi jika dianalisa kondisi dan wujudnya di mental, itu adalah kaifiyat nafsani dan ini adalah haml syina’.

kesimpulannya, ketika seseorang mempersepsi, mentashawur sesuatu (seperti substansi (jauhar) atau ardh (aksiden) ) di luar pikirannya itu terjadi karena ada unsur externalnya , tetapi ketika unsur-unsur externalnya dihilangkan dan menyatu dengan mental (dzihni) maka itu menjadi sebuah kualitas (kaifiyat), tidal lagi memiliki unsur-unsur externalnya.

1. juz`i (partikular) adalah juz`i (partikular)

2. juz’i adalah kulliy (universal)

Tidak bertentangan sebab proposisi pertama di lihat dari mafhum yang kedua dari misdaq. atau yang pertama relasinya adalah hamli dzati dan yang kedua hamli syina’i.

artikel ini masih kasar dan tidak sistematis

Bahrist bahr-e ishq keh hichash kinareh nist

Anja juz an keh jan besparand chareh nist

Spiritual Mulla Shadra, Syuhrawardi dan Ibnu Arabi

Shadra dalam refleksi

Apa yang menarik dari shadra bagiku adalah karena ia seorang realis (muhaqiq), seorang filsuf adalah seorang yang dapat merealisasikan al-Haq, tidak berbeda dengan obsesi Plato yang ingin menjadikan filsafat juga bisa mengubah kehidupan, maka shadra juga demikian. Ia seorang guru kemanusia yang pakar dalam menyampaikan berbagai dimensi islam yang sangat luas; teologi, irfan, filsafat, tafsir, hikmah dsb. Ia tidak seperti Ghazali yang mengalami kesangsian dan harus meragukan segala sesuatu, namun ia mengubah paradigma dan orietasinya atau melakukan pendalaman (deepening). Karena ia segera menyadari posisi dirinya dan apa yang terjadi di sekitarnya. Ia berkata dalam memoirnya bahwa kalau kebenaran itu satu, mengapa setiap disiplin ilmu saling mengklaim dirinya yang paling benar, jadi ada beberapa kebenaran dan sejumlah asumsi yang konsekuensinya membatalkan pandangan yang lain.

Kita berhutang budi kepada para jenius yunani yang telah membakar omega otak kita dengan refleksi-refleksi brilian tentang logos, the one and the mani, perubahan dan permanen. Sesuatu yang menjadi nyawa dari segala penampakan, such matrix ada tapi tidak ada, ada tapi tidak kelihatan. Itu adalah inisiasi sebuah budaya unggul tentnagn bagiamaan refleksi manusia bisa menembus berbagai misteri.

Masa lalu memang tidak pernah diam. Pemikiran-pemikira Plato, Aristoteles, Plotinus, dsb selalu menarik untuk diinvestigasi, dianalisa dan dicermati segala pesonanya dari berbagai sudut pandang.

Sadra memang bak magnit, menyedot perhatian dan cinta dari para ilmuwan. Ia seorang bintang di abad 20 yang sayang masih kurang diapresiasi secara maksimal terutama di kawasan-kawasan muslim, seperti indonesia, malaysia apalagi di negara-negara yang para pengikutnya umumnya literalis, tekstuasli dan tidak begitu concern dengan filsafat atau islamic mysticisme. Bagi saya terlalu sayang untuk diabaikan karena kelemahan atau kekurangan terbuka sebagian kelompok islam sehingga menganggap sepi karya-karya dan pemikiran-pemikirannya. Cara berpikir atau penalaran seperti ini adalah kekeliruan berpikir yang sering menghinggapi benak kaum muslimin, Argumentum ad hominem, yaitu cara berpikir atau penalaran yang menyatakan bahwa jika orang itu saya anggap buruk atau salah, atau karena tidak saya sukai maka apa yang keluar dari pemikiran atau karyanya pasti salah. Tampaknya polymat penulis prolific seperti shadra dan ibnu arabi adalah orang yang sering tidak disukai, dilecehkan dan dianggap guru kesesatan atau guru-guru yagn mengajarkan ajaran ganjil dan tidak sesuai dengan ajaran al-quran dan sunnah atau tradisi para sahabat, maka mereka tidak pantas dipelajari, bahkan mereka perlu dihujat.

Seperti halnya Mulla Shadra ketika mengalami kesulitan memecahkan tema-tema hikmahnya ia akan mendatangi marqad Sayidah Ma’shumah (Adik Imam Ridha as) .

Bagi kita yang ingin membuka mata pengetahuan batin lewat para alim ulama yang ahli al-quran dan pengetahuan-pengetahuan akali,maka kita secara tradisi tidak hanya mempelajari teks book atau karya-karya mereka sendiri, namun kita juga harus berusaha meneladani aktifitasnya. Karya-karya ilmiah Shadra seperti halnya ibnu arabi tidak cukup dengan dikonsumsi oleh akal sahaja, tapi juga harus dihidupkan dalam amal, Jadi teori nadzari dan amaliyahnya harus menyatu barulah seseorang berhasil memahami pengetahuannya secara maksimal.

Syeikh Ahmad Al-Alawi tokoh suci dari Al-Jazair mengatakan, “Seseorang yang tidak mencair di dalam agama maka di dalam tangannya agama akan mencair dan tertumpah.” Maksudnya bahwa eksistensi manusia yang terpecah-pecah menjadi satu perlu menjadi satu lebur dalam kebenaran dengan mencapai kebajikan-kebajikan. Aktualisasi kebenaran di dalam dir manusia. Tidak seperti di barat kata Nasr muncul suatu kelompok ‘tradisionalis’ yang menerima ajaran-ajaran tradisionalis secara mental, namun tidak perlu untuk mempraktekan suatu jalan yang otentik.

Marhalah pertama dari kehidupan intelektual Shadra :

Dulu aku sering sibuk dengan baths dan mengulang-ulang dan muthola’ah kitab-kitab para ahli hikmah dan nazar, sampai aku menyangka aku telah mencapai sesuatu. Tapi ketika bashirahku terbuka dan aku melihat keadaan diriku (tentu setelah melewati tahap pertama), aku melihat diriku-walaupun aku memperoleh sesuatu tentang hal ihwal mabda dan membersihkan dari sifat-sifat imkan dan kebaharuan, dan sedikit tentang ilmu ma’ad untuk nafs-nafs insane- tapi aku kosong dari ilmu hakikat dan hakikat-hakikat a’yan yang tidak bisa dicerap kecuali dengan dzauq dan mukasyafah (Muqadimah tafsir al-Waqiah).

Marhalah kedua : uzlah dan inqitha dalam ibadah di sebagian gunung-gunung yang jauh. Ada juga yang menyebutkanya di Kuhaik di desa Qum. Ia menghabiskan usianya selama 15 tahun. Beliau menuliskan pengalamanya-pengalamana dalam mukadimah asfar dan yang lainnya

Marhalah ketiga yaitu marhalah menulis kitab karena Allah telah mengilhamkan padanya apa yang ia dapati di marhalah kedua.

Sesungguhnya seorang alim secara hakiki adalah arif shufi yang ikhlas dalam menjalankan agama dan membersihkan diri dari kotoran-kotoran dunia dan syahwatnya. Kalau anda ingin melakukan tahkik atas demikian aku akan menggambarkan pada mu perumpamaan sehingga terkuaklah bagi yang mempelajari keutamaan alim, arif dengan sifat-sifatnya dibandingkan alim zahir yang tertipu dengan banyak riwayat tentangya. . JIka (alim zahir) memasuki sebuah majlis dan ia telah menentukan tempatnya sendiri untuk ia duduk sesuai dengan kepercayaan akan kedudukan dan ilmua, dan tiba-tiba masuknya dari jenisnya dan duduk di atas tempatnya, maka si alim itu seperti merasa mengkerut dan dunia menjadi gelap baginya dan kalau bisa ia membunuhnya.

Ini adalah penyakit dan ia tidak sadar (fathana) bahwa penyebab penyakit ini harus diobati dan ia tidak berusaha mencari akar penyakit ini, kalau ia tahu sumber penyakitnya pasti ia akan mengobatinya. Sumber dari hal itu karena ia tidak mau mempelajari ilmu hakikat dan tidak tahu tentang dirinya, ahwal dan martabat-martabatnya,karena itu adalah induk keutamaan dan ashlul hikmah. Dan kunci semua makrifat-makrifat. Dan ia jahil bahwa nafsu ini memberontak dan muncul, bangkit karena kejahilannya. Dan menjadi fir’aun karena ada takabut dan sisa-sisa kekufuran dan ananiyah dan memandang diirnya lebih baik dari uang lain

Di dalam asfar (1/75)

TIdak hanya sekedar pandangan-pandang bahtsiyah (diskursif) yang para ahli syak akan bermain-main dengan menakwilkannya. Maka generasi yang selanjutnya (lahiq) akan mencela generasi lama (sabiq). Dan keduanya tidak mau berdamai (tashaluh)

Ia juga memuji para ahli hikmah besar (kibaril hukama) dan auliya yang memiliki musyahadah yang bercahaya. Misalnya menyangkut mutsul aflaton (alam idea Plato) :

Mereka mencukupkan diri dengan musyahadah yang jelas dan terjadi berulang-ulang pada diri mereka. Kemudian mereka menceritakan kepada yang lain, dan yang lain menjadi percaya dengan mereka atas apa mereka sepakati dan atas keyakinaannya atas apa yang mereka lihat dan mereka juga menceritakannya. Dan tidak ada orang yang bias mendebatnya.

Meskipun dengan keyakinan yang kuat atas mukasyafat, Shadra juga merasa bahwa seorang salik tidak hanya cukup dengan satu jalan (musyahadah tersebut) Ia mengatakan Dan itu ia jelaskan berulang-ulang dalam kitab-kitabnya dan ia menegaskan pentinya menyatukan dua hal tersebut.

Arif dan sufi Agung Mulla Shadra berkata,

Ketahuilah bahwa manusia itu bersekutu dengan hewan dalam urusan syahwat dan bersekutu dengan malaikat dalam akal. Ada yang dicintai akal tapi tidak disukai syahwat, ada yang disukai syahwat tapi tidak disukai akal. Ada juga yang disukai akal dan syahwat bersama-sama dan ada juga yang yang tidak disukai akal dan tidak disukai syahwat sama sama: yang pertama sakit, kemiskinan dan benci dunia, kedua yaitu maksiat, seluruhnya , yang ketiga ilmu, dan yang ekempat kebodohan, kedudukan ilmu dibandingkan kebodohan seperti surga dengan neraka, seperti halnya akal dan syahwat tidak menyukai neraka maka juga tidak menyukai kejahilan. (mafatih al-Gayb)

Ketahuilah bahwa segala sesuatu yang dilakukan manusia dengan jiwanya atau yang dilihat manusia dengan inderanya meninggalkan jejak-jejakn tertentu dalam hakikatnya. Pengaruh-pengaruh gerakan dan aktifitas (psikis) dikumpulkan bersama dalam shuhuf jiwanya dan perbendaraan dari persepsi-persepsinya.Dania adalah kitab yang hari ini tertutup dan tersembunyui dari pemeriksaan teliti penglihatan (fisik),tapi dengan kematian akan diturunkan padanya apa yang tersembunyi dari pandanganya dalam keadaan hidup (jasadi), terekm dalam kitab yang tidak seorangpun yang dapat menjelaskan waktu kedatangannuya selain Dia (QS 7:187).

Mulla Shadra, Syuhrawardi dan Ibnu Arabi

Secara ringkas jelas bahwa filsafat Shadra bersandar pada dua prinsip : yaitu ashalatu wujud ( the principal of eksistensi) dan ashalat wahdat wujud (the princip of unique being). Dan kita bias menambahkan prinsip gradasi wujud yaitu bahwa selain yang sejati adalah wujud maka atsar eksternal segala sesuatu (things) juga berasal dari wujud dan bukan mahiyat. Wujud memang bermacam-macam tapi perbedaanya karena gradasi dan bukan karena mahiyat. Wujud mental dan wujud ilmu juga dengan martabat-martabatnya memiliki atsar-atsar.

Syuhrawardi mengatakan bahwa sesuatu (things) secara awaliyah terbagi kepada nur dan dhau. Syuhrawardi menyebutkan jism (bodi) dan madah (materi) sebagai barzakh.

Terangnya barzakh karena cahaya dan ini adalah cahaya ardhi (horizontal) yang mengeluarkan barzakh dari dunia kegelapan dan memberinya cahaya Cahaya telah menyelamatkan barzakh seperti cahaya matahari yang memberi kehidupan. Cahayalah yang memberi kehidupan kepada barzakh. (Syarah Qutub).

Syuhrawardi mengatakan bahwa ilmu dan idrak terkait dengan cahaya. Wujud yang gelap tidak akan bisa melihat dzat diirnya dan juga melihat yang lain. Setiap maujud yang memiliki cahaya yang lebih banyak dan maka idrak dan ilmunya lebih sempurna dan lebih banyak. Ini adalah cahaya yang tampak untuk dirinya dan menampakan yang lain. Ia mengaakan cahaya itu ibarat sesuatu yang tampak pada dirinya dan hidup karena mencerap ( darrak), faal (aktif) jadi kehidupan adalah cahaya dan ilmu adalah cahaya. Anwar dzati, anwar ardi, dan muktasab dalam filsafat wujudi shadra adalah wujud.

Menurut syuhrawardi perbedaan antara cahaya-cahaya karena perbedaan kesempurnaan dan kekurangannya. Seperti juga shadra mengatakan bahwa wujud itu berbeda karena gradasinya , hanya perbedaan menurut shadra yang membedakan dan yang menyatukan adalah satu yaitu wujud, sementara syuhrawaradi mengtakan bahwa yang membedakana karena hal-hal yang eksternal dari dzat cahaya.

Dalam system penciptaan nurul anwar adalah asal dan cahaya-cahaya lain adalah thuliyah dan ardhiyan keluar dari nurul anwar. Seperti hanyal dalam hal wujud, wujud hakiki akmal dan fauqa kamal adalah asal. Dan martabat-martabat wujud berasal dari faid aqdas yaitu wujud tam dan kamil. Dalam system nur Syuhrawardi segala sesuatu dan semua tempat cahaya adalah asal. Dan memiliki proses, qudrat, hayat, ilmu iradah semua adalah cahaya : anwar dzati, anwar ardhi dan muktasabi. SEmentara dalam filsafat Mulla Shadra segala sesuatu adalah wujud. Ilmu, iradah, qudrat, fi’liyat, shurat (form) semuanya adalah wujud dan martabat-martabat wujud. CAhaya-caya yang turun dari nurul anwar semakin dekat dengan nrul anwar maka cahaya semakin kuat. Demikian juga shadra bahwa wujud-wujud itu semakin dengna dengan wujud yang merupakan ilatnya ilat, maka wujudnya lebih sempurna dan lebih memiliki efek (muatsir). Seperti : akal, nafs, shurah (form) materi, materi. Dan yan g lebih rendah lagi yaitu hayula (materi awal). JAdi fondasi dari hikmah muta’aliyah shadra adalah hikmat isyraq dan dalam beberapa hal shadra juga menyandarkan padanya.

FIlsafat illuminasionis

Syuhrawardi mengatakan bahwa filsafat diskursif adalah lahir dari penalaran dan hikmat sejati yatiu hikmat dzauqi dan filsuf sejati adalah filsuf yang mencapati kesempurnaan dalam hikmat bahsti dan hikmat dzauqi. Hikmat yang diinginkan syariat dan digemarkan oleh riwayat-riwayat

Mulla Shadra dan Ibnu Arabi

Sandaran lain karya-karya Mulla Shadra adalah Pikiran Ibnu arabi. Ibnu arabi adalah pengasas mazhab yang berpijak pada wujud setelah Halaj, Bayazid Busthami dan para arif besar lain di abad ke 4- 5. Mistikis ibnu arabi berkisar seputar wujud seperti juga Mulla shadra mengutip pernyataan ibnu arabi.

Kitab yang paling penting Ibnu arabi yang memuat doktrin-doktri metafisiknya adalah Fushus (dan juga kita teraakhirnya, kitab terakhir yang ditulis shadra adalah syawahid rububiyah). Dalam kitab tersebut Ibnu arabi membahas wujud dan wahdatul wujud dan hubungan wujud al-Haq dengan mumkinat.

Metodanya adalah imajinatif dengan bahasa-bahasa yang metaforis tidak analitiks seperti dalam filsafat peripatetic dan Isyraqi (illuminasi).. Ibn ‘Arabi adalah “expositor” par excellence tasawwuf Islami.[1]

Inti sari dari pemikiran ibnu arabi berkenaan dengan tindakan-tindakan praktis ada dalam kitab futuhat makiyah dan Shadra kadang-kadang melakukan kritikan atas pemikiran Ibnu arabi. Shadra meskipun seorang murid tapi ia adalah murid yang memberikan sekeletikal bone (punggung yang kuat) bagi Ibnu arabi.[2] Hermenetika Ibnu Arabi yang sekedar berlandaskan pada ilmu pemberian tuhan dan ilmu capaian (muktasabi) di kukuhkan oleh Shadra dengan filsafat sintetis antara intuitif dan rasionalnya karena itu lah kenapa ia memberi nama magnum Opusnya dengan nama Al-asfar aqliyah (journey rasional).

---

[1] Sepertinya ada perbedaan antara para ‘Arifin jalur Ibn ‘Arabi dengan Hukama’ Muta’allihin dalam masalah gradasi ini. ‘Urafa’ menyatakan bahwa gradasi hanya terjadi dalam maratib dan manifestasi al-Wujud, tetapi tidak pada Esensi al-Wujud, sementara hukama’ berpendapat bahwa gradasi terjadi pada haqiqat al-wujud itu sendiri (Ust Muhammad Baqir).

[2] Muhammad Ridha Jurri dalam artikel The Influence Of Ibnu Arabi Doctrine of the unity of Being on The transcendental Theosophy of Shadra al-Din Shirazi mengatakan, the areas of consensus between shadra and ibnu arabi not only restricted to doctrine of the individual uniqueness of being. Mulla shadra support ibnu arabi ideas on several other important issues, suc as the notion of the imaginal world, the eternal achetypes, after life states, eschatology, as well as his hermenetical approach the Qoran.

asfar jilid 2 (Mulla Shadra)

Fashal awal, makna-makna quwwah (potensi)

Kata quwwah memiliki arti yang beragam dan tampaknya digunakan sebagai kata yang berarti suatu tenaga yang dimiliki oleh hewan sebagai sumber aktifitasnya. kata ini juga digunakan dengan arti lawan dari kelemahan. dan ketika diartikan qudrah (kekuatan) maka maksudnya adalah kekuatan yang kuat dan berlebihan (ziyadah).

Sayyid Husain Waizi

 

KETERPAUTAN jiwa pada tubuh, menyangkut eksistensi dan individuasinya (tasyakhhus), merupakan keterikatan sementara dan bukan urutan subsisten. Pada tahapan perwujudan awalnya, dan sekaitan dengan asal-usul temporal, jiwa tergantung pada materi, dalam urutan selanjutnya, melampaui semua ketergantungan tersebut.

Semula, jiwa menyerupai fakultas-fakultas lain yang merupakan watak materi, dan tergantung kepadanya —suatu bentuk materi yang samar dan tak dapat dispesifikasi, yakni tubuh itu sendiri. Kendatipun tubuh ini mengalami perubahan dan transformasi sepanjang masa hidupnya, jiwa senantiasa terikat pada tubuh yang tidak menentu dan samar ini. Yakni, sekaitan dengan jiwa, manusia mempunyai kepribadian tunggal, yang berlawanan dengan tubuh dari jiwa, yang tidak identik, dalam suatu perubahan dan transformasi konstan.

Pada kenyataannya, keterikatan jiwa pada tubuh terkait dengan keterikatan yang paling lemah. Ia seperti keterikatan seorang tukang kayu pada perkakasnya, yang  tanpa itu ia tidak dapat melakukan pekerjaannya. Demikian pula jiwa tidak dapat mempersepsi entitas-entitas maujud dan objek-objek kendriya (sensible objects) tanpa sarana-sarananya, dan pemahamannya tergantung pada instrumen-instrumen ragawi. Setelah beberapa waktu, sebagai akibat penggunaan berulang-ulang dari instrumen-instrumen ini, suatu kekuatan habitual tertentu (malakah) tercipta dalam jiwa, yang melalui sarana tersebut orang mampu menghasilkan pada dirinya sendiri suatu citra dari objek kendriya, dalam setiap bentuk yang ia pilih, tanpa membutuhkan bantuan instrumen-instrumen ragawi, padahal pada awalnya fenomena tersebut adalah mustahil.

Karena itu, pada awalnya, jiwa kosong dari setiap kesempurnaan dan bentuk, baik (bentuk) kendriya, imajinal, ataupun intelektual. Akan tetapi, pada akhirnya, ia mencapai suatu titik di mana ia bisa melepaskan setiap bentuk—partikular maupun universal—dari materi dan mempersepsinya atau melihatnya dalam dirinya sendiri.

Selanjutnya, jiwa, pada permulaannya, merupakan suatu wujud potensial, kosong dari kesempurnaan, suatu nonentitas yang halus; dan ia menanggung kesamaan penting dengan tubuh. Dalam madah lain, ia adalah tahapan ragawi terakhir dan tahapan spiritual awal, yang di titik itu bukanlah tubuh murni ataupun ruh murni; alih-alih ia merupakan kesempurnaan ragawi dan potensialitas spiritual; dan pada tahapan akhirnya ia sampai pada keterlepasan murni (tajarrud–e-mahd) dari materi dan kebebasan dari tubuh.¹

Setiap perbuatan ragawi pada kenyataannya merupakan perbuatan jiwa; seperti melihat dengan mata, mendengar melalui telinga, dan sejenisnya; sekalipun faktanya fenomena ini muncul melalui persepsi indra, pelaku sebenarnya dari perbuatan tersebut adalah jiwa itu sendiri. Dengan demikian, sesungguhnya jiwalah yang menjadi pendengar dan pelihat (juga wujud yang berbeda dari itu)², yang menggunakan fakultas-fakultas persepsi.

Jiwa kita sendiri adalah pemersepsi dari setiap objek partikular atau kesan-indrawi. Ia penggerak setiap gerakan yang hidup atau alamiah yang terkait dengan daya-daya (indrawi) kita, khususnya di antara organ-organ yang lebih dekat pada cakrawala dunia jiwa.

Dengan demikian, jiwa itu sendiri merupakan daya untuk melihat pada mata, daya untuk mendengar pada telinga, indra penyentuh pada tangan, kemampuan melangkah pada kaki. Itulah esensi daya-daya tersebut yang meliputi semua bagian tubuh, dan melalui organ-organ inilah ia (jiwa) melihat, mendengar, meraba, berjalan, dan melakukan perbuatan-perbuatan lain. Jiwa, meskipun kesatuan dan pemisahannya (tajarrud) dari tubuh dan daya-daya dan bagiannya, tidaklah absen dari setiap bagian tubuh, baik yang utama ataupun yang rendah, baik yang kuat ataupun yang halus; dan ia juga tidak terpisah dari fakultas (tubuh) apa pun, baik fakultas pemahaman ataupun gerakan, baik fakultas “hewani” ataupun natural. Yakni, fakultas atau daya-daya pada diri mereka sendiri tidaklah memiliki identitas (huwwiyyah) selain identitas dari jiwa; dan identitas bagian-bagian tubuh dan sebagian daya-daya tubuh mencair dalam identitas ruh dan “keakuan”-nya.³

 

Kemanusiaan Seseorang Terletak pada Jiwanya

Individuasi tubuh manusia terjadi melalui jiwa dalam suatu cara jelas dan berbeda. Subjek gerakan kuantitatif (harkat-e kammi) dari manusia—seperti gerak pertumbuhan (numuww) dan perkembangan (rusyd) materinya—juga kepribadiannya, muncul dari jiwa yang satu. Individuasi umat manusia muncul melalui sarana-sarana jiwa, suatu jiwa yang merupakan bentuk dari esensinya dan, yang tetap konstan ketika bagian-bagian ragawi sampai pada ajalnya; keberlanjutan jiwa yang tunggal, yang spesifik, dari masa kanak-kanak melalui kedewasaan hingga usia tua, diturunkan dari keabadian jiwa.

Individuasi tubuh dan bagian-bagiannya, bersama dengan kehidupan yang mengalir melalui bagian-bagian tersebut, datang dari jiwa, sementara individuasi jiwa terjadi melalui esensinya. Individuasi tubuh dapat dipahami dalam sorotan dua faktor berikut: 1) Ia adalah  tubuh dari jiwa ini; 2) Ia merupakan kenyataan pada dirinya sendiri, dan suatu substansi (jawhar) dari alam materi.

Menurut faktor pertama, tubuh itu subsisten dan keberadaannya terus menerus melalui keberadaan jiwa, yakni bentuk esensi ini dan sebab eksistensialnya (‘illat –e-wujudi); akan tetapi, sebagai akibat dari faktor kedua, ia tunduk pada penyimpangan dan transformasi, dan mudah terpengaruh dengan penambahan dan pengurangan. Karena itu, jika orang ditanya: apakah tubuh dari orang ini sama dengan tubuh pada waktu mudanya, jawaban bisa “ya” dan “tidak” —“ya” sejauh menyangkut faktor pertama dan “tidak” ketika berkaitan dengan faktor kedua dari dua faktor yang disebutkan. Dalam sorotan faktor pertama, karena transformasi dari satu tubuh ke tubuh lain terjadi secara serentak dengan keberadaan jiwa, adalah benar untuk mengatakan bahwa ia pada esensinya merupakan tubuh yang sama; karena tubuh yang sekarang identik dengan tubuh sebelumnya yang dimiliki di masa kanak-kanak sejauh personalitas dan kekhususan dari individu itu, sejak asal mula keberadaan manusianya hingga akhir usia tuanya, ada sebagaimana adanya dan konstan, bahkan ketika eksistensi ragawinya mengalami perubahan.

Penilaian pertama adalah benar sejauh kita bisa menetapkan, bahwa ketika tubuh telah diubah menjadi tubuh yang lain, jiwa tetap sama pada keduanya, karena tubuh yang belakangan persis dengan tubuh sebelumnya yang dimiliki pada masa kanak-kanak dan dewasa; ini benar karena personalitas orang tersebut—bersama dengan  individuasinya dari awal keberadaannya sampai akhir usia tuanya—adalah ada dan abadi, sementara tubuhnya telah mengalami perubahan.

Dari pandangan-pandangan di  atas, prinsip-prinsip tertentu dapat dibangun: a) Penetapan kebangkitan tubuh (ma’ad–e-jismani) dan pembentukan kembali tubuh; b) Kebangkitan (hasyr) sejumlah orang dalam bentuk hewan yang bermacam-macam sekalipun mereka memelihara kepribadian individu yang sama yang mereka miliki di bumi; c) Manusia, sekalipun berpisah dari materi dan tubuh, masih memiliki individuasi. Personalitasnya, baik ia terpisah dari atau melekat pada tubuh, tidak hancur, dan dalam semua keadaan ini ia mempunyai personalitas yang tunggal.⁴

 

Tubuh adalah Kendaraan Jiwa

Kendatipun bersumber dari alam yang tinggi dan kini bersemayam di dunia ini, jiwa mempunyai modus unifikasi dengan fakultas-fakultasnya; dan fakta bahwa ia berada dalam tubuh dan menyatu dengan daya-dayanya tidak berlawanan dengan transendensi materi bawaannya dan wujudnya yang berbeda dari materialitas. Karena itu, kadang-kadang ia memiliki modus wujud yang berbeda dari materi dan terlepas dari segala sesuatu selain Allah Swt. Di saat lain ia menurun menjadi fakultas-fakultas materi dan melekat kepadanya. Karena itu, bisa kita katakan bahwa jiwa mempunyai dua dimensi, satu menghadap alam yang tinggi, dan yang lain mengarah alam yang rendah.⁵

Ibn ‘Arabi berkata, “Tubuh memiliki kedekatan dengan jiwa, karena ia adalah tempat yang ke dalamnya ruh dan intelek ditiupkan; dan intelek adalah wujud pertama yang diciptakan oleh Yang Nyata. Dalam hal ini, Allah berfirman, …Dan Aku tiupkan ke dalamnya ruh-Ku.⁶ Dengan demikian, jiwa lebih tinggi derajatnya daripada tubuh dan lebih rendah ketimbang intelek, dan ia merupakan medan bagi penumbuhan ruh. Dan benih yang Allah —dengan sarana ruh—telah tanam di ladang jiwa bersemi lebih dari [sekadar] imajinasi-imajinasi, hasrat-hasrat, dan hal-hal lainnya. Dengan demikian, semua sains, pemikiran, dan perbuatan dicapai melalui bibit yang ditanam dan ditumbuhkan oleh Allah melalui ruh ke dalam jiwa dan tubuh. Inilah bagaimana jiwa mempunyai aspek yang naik menuju alam yang lebih tinggi dan aspek yang turun menuju alam yang lebih rendah.”⁷

Menurut uraian ini, manusia tersusun (murakkab) dari tubuh dan ruh. Tubuh menyerupai kendaraan (markab) dan ruh pengendaranya (râkib). Adapun tujuan dari perjalanan ini adalah akhirat dan kedekatan ilahi. Karena itu, sebaik-baiknya perbuatan bagi tubuh adalah melakukan amal perbuatan yang menciptakan kedekatan ini dengan ruh, melalui ibadah kepada Allah Swt dan melalui khidmat kepada-Nya. Ini merupakan tahapan pertama dari kebahagiaan umat manusia dan [pemenuhan] akan hikmah penciptaan.

Perbuatan terbaik dari ruh adalah menyatu dengan Yang Hakiki dan melepaskan diri dari selain-Nya; sebagai dampak dari memelihara perilaku ini, ruh mencapai tahapan keterbebasan dan keterlepasan dari ikatan-ikatan [material]; dan karena itu cahaya wilayah gaib menjadi menjelma.⁸

Walaupun jiwa adalah pengendara bagi tubuh, ia tidak bisa memengaruhi organ-organ material elementer dari tubuh secara langsung. Dengan demikian, kendaraan adalah penting untuk bagian istimewa ini dan kendaraan ini merupakan tubuh yang bercahaya dan halus yang disebut ruh yang bercahaya (ruh-e-bukhari).⁹

Ruh inilah yang menembus bagian-bagian tubuh dan syaraf-syaraf otak; ia lebih lembut (lathîf) keberadaannya, lebih dekat kepada aktualitasnya (fi’liyyat) dan lebih jauh dari kepasifan (infi’al) dan dari dipengaruhi [oleh elemen-elemen eksternal], dan sebaliknya: lebih kuat (katsif) ia, lebih dekat pada potensi (quwweh) dan lebih pasif ia. Karena itu, ruh instingtif atau bukhâri lebih rendah tingkatannya dari jiwa dan lebih tinggi dari tubuh, sebagai penghubung dan mediator antara tubuh dan jiwa. Secara jelas, antara keduanya mediator-mediator lain adalah penting, seperti alam mitsal (barzakh–e mitsali) yang merupakan mediator antara jiwa rasional (nafs-e natiqeh) dan ruh binatang (ruh-e haywani), atau seperti sebagian dari bagian-bagian tubuh yang terhubung pada ruh yang menguap (bukhâri) melalui bagian tubuh yang dominan.¹⁰

Menurut Ibn ‘Arabi, gabungan antara binatang rasional yang tersembunyi dan binatang rasional yang menjelma adalah apa yang disebut seorang manusia. Dengan demikian, dengan perginya ruh dan jiwa, yang mencakup dimensi rasionalitas ini pada diri manusia, bentuk yang tersisa tidak lagi disebut seorang manusia, dan tidak lagi ada perbedaan antara yang disebut manusia, pepohonan, dan sejenisnya.¹¹

Dengan demikian, menyangkut kebutuhan jiwa akan tubuh, Ibn ‘Arabi dan Mulla Shadra dalam dua paparan yang berbeda, mendukung keyakinan yang sama. Ibn ‘Arabi memandang tubuh sebagai padang pertumbuhan bagi jiwa, sementara Mulla Shadra melihat tubuh sebagai kendaraan jiwa; kedua citra itu menyampaikan makna jiwa yang menggunakan tubuh untuk perbuatan-perbuatannya sendiri.

 

Kematian Alamiah

Jiwa adalah pembawa tubuh dan bukan sebaliknya. Hal ini berlawanan dengan apa yang kebanyakan orang kira dan bahkan cenderung menganggap bahwa jiwa diciptakan dari tubuh, dan bisa diperkuat dengan nutrisinya. Sebaliknya, jiwa itu sendiri, sebab [perantara] bagi keberadaan tubuh dan adalah jiwa ini yang melintasi jalan-jalan dan tahapan-tahapan yang berbeda-beda dan mengendalikan tubuh, dan bahkan mengarahkannya dengan cara-cara yang bertolak belakang dengan kecenderungan-kecenderungan alamiah tubuh itu sendiri. Umpamanya, tubuh —karena wataknya— cenderung untuk menurun, sementara jiwa yang menyebabkannya naik dan bergerak ke alam-alam yang lebih tinggi.

Naiknya ke alam mulia melalui tubuh elemental dan kasar ini secara intelektual adalah mustahil. Tubuh haruslah bersinar dan sejalan dengan alam ruh; dan kondisi ini direalisasikan setelah kebebasan jiwa dari tubuh material. Pada dasarnya, manusia, dalam melewati tahapan-tahapan wujud yang lebih tinggi, terlalu agung untuk tunduk pada tubuh materialnya. Alih-alih, tubuhlah yang mengikuti jiwa secara pasti dari tahapan-tahapan rendah dari pertumbuhan. Karena itu, dengan menerima gagasan ini, gagasan reinkarnasi (tanasukh) adalah sesuatu yang mustahil dan ditolak; termasuk juga gagasan bahwa kematian merupakan akibat dari kelemahan dan keausan kekuatan-kekuatan tubuh. Menerima proposisi ini akan berakibat pada entitas yang sempurna atau utuh menjadi entitas yang tanpurna sekali lagi tanpa alasan apa pun. Ketika jiwa mencapai perkembangan dan tak lagi membutuhkan tubuh, bagaimana mungkin baginya untuk menempati tubuh lain? Dalam kematian, jiwa mencapai keterlepasan dari tubuh, dan akibatnya kendalinya atas tubuh pun berakhir. Karena itu, kelemahan natural dari tubuh dalam usia lanjut hanyalah perubahan esensi [ragawi] dan terjadi dengan mendekatnya jiwa pada alam akhirat.

Tautan jiwa pada tubuh laksana kapal yang kuat, berikut semua peralatan dan perlengkapan yang menjadikannya operatif, melayari samudera.¹² Kapal di bawah pengaruh Allah Swt mengarungi lautan keberadaan yang tak berpantai. Di sini, jiwa laksana angin yang menggerakkan kapal tersebut dengan pusarannya; dan kehendak dan pengaturan jiwa bisa diperbandingkan dengan arah angin yang menggerakkan kapal. Dengan demikian, sekiranya jiwa menjadi terikat pada tubuh, dan hembusan angin dan pusaran kehendak dan perintahnya atas kapal tubuh melemah, maka gerakan kapal pun berkurang.

Dengan begitu, sesungguhnya anginlah yang membawa kapal dan kapal itu sendiri tidak punya kekuatan apa pun untuk mengendalikan angin; reinkarnasi adalah kembalinya jiwa yang sempurna ke alam ketanpurnaan, yang artinya kembalinya angin ke kapal. Jadi, reinkarnasi dan pemindahan jiwa ke tubuh lain adalah hal yang musykil karena jiwalah yang mengumpulkan tubuh dan membangun harmoni pada bagian-bagiannya: tidaklah masalah bahwa jiwa semata-mata terjadi secara serentak dengan tubuh dan elemen-elemen primernya.¹³

 

Tubuhlah yang Hidup Bersama Jiwa

Tatkala jiwa meninggalkan tubuh, unsur paling kecil dari tubuh tetap bersama jiwa, yang dalam riwayat-riwayat, dikenal sebagai  ‘ajb al-dzanb, dan “jejak dan akar dari ekor”. Ada tafsiran yang berbeda-beda yang diberikan untuk pengertian terminologi ini: “materi awal” (haylaye ula), “intelek materi” (‘aqle hayulani), “unsur-unsur primordial makhluk manusia”, “dimensi jiwa setelah meninggal”, “substansi individual”, “dimensi kedua dari jiwa”, dan “esensi-esensi atau entitas-entitas tetap” (‘a’yan-e tsabite) merupakan sebagian interpretasi yang diberikan pada terma-terma ini.

Mulla Shadra percaya bahwa  ‘ajb al-dzanb’ tiada lain adalah “kekuatan imajinasi” yakni unsur terakhir yang dicapai dari daya-daya alamiah, vegetatif, dan hewani, dan dicapai bersama dengan materi yang penting bagi tubuh di dunia ini. Imajinasi ini merupakan level pertama dari domain wujud akhirat dan level puncak dari alam materi karena tidak ada sesuatu pun dalam keadaan aktualnya, apakah materi, bentuk, ataupun kekuatannya bisa bergerak dari dunia ini ke akhirat kecuali setelah menjalani perubahan-perubahan dan cipta ulang-cipta ulang tertentu. Manusia tidak disiapkan untuk kebangkitan (hasyr) kecuali dengan fakultas kesempurnaan yang merupakan bentuk final dari keberadaannya, karena semua daya yang ia miliki, seperti daya melihat, daya mendengar, daya menyentuh, dan seterusnya, laksana radiasi eksistensinya yang menyimpan bentuk-bentuk kognitif dan imajinal dari entitas-entitas materi luar dalam imajinasi, sehingga apabila entitas-entitas tersebut hilang, bentuk-bentuk mereka terpelihara [secara batin]. Ini serupa dengan keberadaan jiwa setelah kehancuran tubuh. Daya ini adalah daya yang memelihara bentuk-bentuk imateri dari entitas-entitas luar, entitas-entitas yang tetap ada dalam bentuk ide-ide setelah kemusnahan tubuh dan yang bersemayam di alam akhirat; mereka dipandang sebagai atap dunia dan permadani akhirat.¹⁴

Dengan demikian, jiwa manusia, selama perpisahannya dari tubuh, memiliki suatu daya imajinasi yang memudahkannya untuk memahami dimensi gaib dari kesan-kesan indrawi dunia ini dalam partikular-partikular mereka dan juga memengaruhi mereka. Pemahaman ini merupakan asas gratifikasi-indra di dunia ini; bagaimanapun, dalam banyak hal, kesan-kesan indra yang berbeda ini mirip materi awal (hayulâ) dan ditunjang oleh tubuh ini. Bagaimanapun, mereka semua ditempatkan di satu tempat karena ia merupakan jiwa yang satu yang mendukung mereka.

Sekarang, adalah dengan kematianlah bahwa manusia dipisahkan dari dunia dan keterikatan-keterikatannya, sementara ia hidup dengan kekuatan konsepsi itu, dan dengan kekuatan ini ia membentuk suatu gambaran akan esensi dirinya sendiri. Esensi ini terpisah dari dunia dan jiwa bisa membentuk dalam imajinasinya bentuk manusia yang meninggal dan dikubur; jiwa berbuat demikian dalam suatu cara sehingga ia mengalami penderitaan-penderitaan hukuman fisik dalam modus yang masuk akal; kondisi ini disebut “siksa kubur”.

Apabila jiwa ditetapkan untuk kebahagiaan, ia menggambarkan esensinya dalam bentuk malaikat, bersama dengan pahala yang dijanjikan, dan ini dikenal sebagai “nikmat kubur”.

Fenomena bahwa manusia melihat setelah kematian, seperti keadaan-keadaan kubur dan kebangkitan, merupakan entitas-entitas imajinal yang tidak ada dalam bentuk yang konkret. Dengan demikian bagi jiwa, pengalaman akan fenomena akhirat —apakah supraformal ataukah formal— akan ditentukan oleh jiwa; kedua jenis fenomena tersebut muncul melalui persepsi jiwa, yang salah satunya muncul melalui intrumen-instrumen jasmani dan yang lainnya melalui esensi jiwanya sendiri.

Jadi, dunia ini dan akhirat merupakan dua keadaan jiwa dan akhirat sesungguhnya merupakan kepergian jiwa dari debu alam korporeal. Sebab kematian alamiah pun merupakan aktualisasi dari jiwa dan trans-substansi (tajawhur) serta transformasinya (taqallub) menuju alam dan tatanan tersebut yang kepadanya jiwa dimiliki dengan benar, dengan mengarahkannya kembalinya pada Allah Swt. Dalam kembalinya, jiwa merasakan rahmat pahala ataukah derita siksa. Sebagai akibatnya, semakin sedikit keterikatan jiwa pada tubuh di dunia ini, semakin besar kesucian dan keterlepasan jiwa dari materi, entitas-entitas material dan tubuh dalam alam barzakh dan akhirat; [proses ini terus berlanjut sampai] suatu  tahap dicapai yang dengannya ia dapat mengasumsikan keadaan intelek murni.¹⁵

 

Pengaturan Tubuh oleh Jiwa

Tubuh manusia laksana massa yang berat dan kuat, sedangkan jiwa menyerupai cahaya halus; dan dengan karunia Tuhan, suatu ikatan diciptakan antara jiwa dan tubuh, meskipun dalam arti yang ultimat mereka jauh berbeda. Dari setetes mani, Allah Swt menciptakan tubuh yang bentuknya masih samar, dan dari substansi halus ini, hati yang lembut dimunculkan, dari kemurnian hati, ruh diberadakan.

Dalam kehalusan dan kesuciannya, ruh serupa dengan sfera langit (aflak). Allah Swt menjadikan ruh sarang bagi jiwa rasional, sehingga ia bisa mendapatkan kesempurnaan dengan cara kembalinya ia pada Allah Swt dan menjadikan tubuh sarana untuk kesempurnaan ruh.¹⁶

Ketika jiwa memperoleh kedekatan pada unsur-unsur primer dari tubuh—seperti hati—tubuh menjadi “terjiwakan” (nafsani); dan di saat ini jiwa memberikan kehidupan kepada [kekuatan] “hewani” melalui sarana hati, dan yang dengannya menciptakan harmoni dan keseimbangan dalam daya-daya tersebut juga pada organ-organ tubuh. Hati adalah bagian yang menguasai tubuh material; dengan sarana hati dan pengaturan jiwalah, maka kesempurnaan atas bagian-bagian tubuh lainnya diraih. Karena alasan inilah tubuh hewani memiliki suatu jiwa dan bahwa sebagian lagi dari organ-organ tubuh melayaninya (jiwa).

Hubungan antara tubuh dan jiwa pada dasarnya korelatif (‘alâqeye luzumiyyeh). Hubungan ini bersifat spesifik, watak yang ditentukan, yang termasuk suatu jenis (hubungan timbal balik) antara dua unsur (du amre mutadayif) atau keterikatan mutual; ia bukan hubungan (rabthi) [antara dua faktor yang, selain hubungan partikular ini, merupakan agen-agen independen]; sebaliknya, hubungan antara tubuh dan jiwa ibarat hubungan yang membawa dua entitas korelatif secara esensial seperti “materi” dan “forma”, yang masing-masing saling membutuhkan. Tubuh jiwa memerlukan jiwa karena aktualisasinya—bukan sejumlah jiwa partikular, melainkan jiwa sebagaimana adanya; demikian pula sebaliknya jiwa membutuhkan akan keterikatan spesifiknya sendiri dan karena formasi identitasnya sendiri. Jadi, penguasaan jiwa atas tubuh merupakan penguasaan esensial, dan bukan sementara, tabiat; karena secara temporal jiwa terjelma bersama dengan tubuh. Karena itu, keberadaan dan kelangsungan jiwa serentak dengan tubuh, dan [substansi spiritual] yang tetap setelah matinya tubuh termasuk dari hakikat yang berbeda.

Bahwa yang memberi jiwa ke-jiwa-annya (nafsiyyat) merupakan kenyataan dimana fungsi-fungsinya seperti halnya dalam tubuh dan mencapai kesempurnaan di dalamnya sebagai kedudukan “bentuk” sempurna dari tubuh. Penggabungan dua elemen ini merupakan ragam penggabungan yang natural, dan dengan demikian tidak bisa dipisahkan secara tegas dari alam materi. Itulah mengapa, sepanjang tubuh mempunyai jiwa dan “bentuk”, jiwa tidak mempunyai keberadaan yang sepenuhnya terpisah dari materi. Bagaimanapun, seiring waktu, sustansinya menjadi disempurnakan dan terlepas dari materi, mencapai modus intelektual dari wujud. Adalah wujud intelektuallah yang bertahan dan yang tidak menyusut dengan penyusutan tubuh.¹⁷[]

 

Catatan Kaki

1.       Mulla Shadra, al-Asfâr, v.8, h. 326-329.

2.      Catatan penerjemah Inggris: Dalam kata lain, jiwa merupakan agen penglihat dan agen pendengar, tetapi tidak dapat direduksi ke aspek ini dari agensinya. Karena itulah jiwa adalah agen sebenarnya dari perbuatan-perbuatan ini sekaligus dan selain agen dari perbuatan-perbuatan ini.

3.      Ibid., vol.6, hh.377-379.

4.      Mulla Shadra, Tafsîr al-Qur’ân al-Karîm, vol.5, h.372-375.

5.      Mulla Shadra, al-Syawâhid al-Rububiyyah, h.195-196.

6.      ‘…Dan telah meniupkan ke dalamnya ruh-Ku …’ (QS. al-Hijr: 29)

7.      Ibn ‘Arabi, al-Futuhât al-Makiyyah, vol.8, Bab.70, h. 310-313.

8.      Mulla Shadra, Tafsîr al-Qur’ân al-Karîm, vol.1, h. 91.

9.      Ruh-e-bukhârî adalah nama yang digunakan oleh para dokter ketika mereka merujuk ruh.

10.  Mulla Shadra, al-Asfâr, vol.9, h.74-77.

11.   Ibn ‘Arabî, Fushush al-Hikam, Fa¥¥-e-Shîthî, h.91

12.   Bahwa yang dimaksud dengan ‘peralatan dan perlengkapan’ ketika diterapkan pada jiwa, secara jelas adalah fakultas pengetahuan, persepsi, dan sejenisnya.

13.   Mulla Shadra, al-Asfâr, vol.9, h.54-55.

14.  Ibid., vol.9, hh.221-222.

Epistemology

 

1. Mental Existence

Muslim philosophers have divided existence into two types: objective (or external) existence and mental (or psychological) existence. Mental existence represents the existence of subjects in the mind when they are imagined or function as subjects for predicates in propositions. Such subjects or mental existents might have an extension in the outside, as well as not.

For example, we sometimes consider ‘non-existence’ as the subject, and pose a number of judgments for it in the mind and in propositions which are true but lack external objectivity. Besides, concerning non-existent and impossible objects (agreement of opposites), we sometimes imagine the universalities (as well as existents, completely detached from all their characteristics) in the mind. A universal thing, whether a concept or a judgment, is created in the mind, and, as we know, is of an abstract existence; however, since it has no existence in the outside world; it exists in another place, i.e., in the mind. The existence of such existents is called mental existence. The perception of such an existence is instinctive, and everybody perceives and accepts it by his inner sense (This issue supports the idea of mental existence).

The division of existence into mental and external ones could also be generalized to the division of quiddity. Accordingly, it can be said that quiddity or essence is of two types: external and mental.

Available evidence suggests that this important philosophical issue has no record in Greek philosophy, and is among the findings of Muslim philosophers and Islamic philosophy. Apparently, the first person who devoted an independent chapter to mental existence in his book was Fakhr Razi, the well-known Iranian theologian (in his al-Mabahith al-mashriqiyyah).[1] In the introduction of his book, he states that he has been inspired by the ideas of his preceding philosophers in writing this book.

The issue of mental existence has two aspects. On the one hand, it has an ontological dimension, since it is a kind of existence which has been weakened  to a great extent and lost the features and effects of external existence. However, in its own turn – and not in opposition to external existence – it is an external existence (since man and his soul and mind possess such an existence), yet, when it is contrasted with an objective external existent, it is called mental existence.

On the other hand, this issue is an epistemological one and deals with the formation of knowledge and awareness in man and his relation with the outside world.

In occidental philosophy, epistemology is separated from ontology and appears in a different horizon, so that, unless the problem of knowledge is clarified, there will logically remain no context for ontology. Nevertheless, these two disciplines have been intermixed to some extent in Islamic philosophy, where man’s knowledge is related to the knowledge of existence. In systematic philosophical discussions, however, epistemology comes before ontology and other philosophical issues, and is considered as their threshold. Mulla Sadra has discussed the topic of knowledge – of which mental existence is a part – in different places for specific philosophical considerations. We will refer to a part of this issue in the discussion of the unity of the knower, the known, and knowledge.

The issue of mental existence can be viewed as a link between ontology and epistemology, clarifying the relation between man and the world. The issue of the correspondence between the external world and the mind is posed and analyzed in this part. Most Muslim philosophers believe that what is formed in the mind is the very essence or quiddity rather than an image, so that if a quiddity refers to an external existent and, in fact, belongs to the category of knowledge, it will be the same as the quiddity of the external object which has been transferred to the mind without its objective existence and external effects.

 

In the past, a number of important and technical criticisms were targeted at the problem of mental existence which many philosophers were unable to respond to or solve. For example, they said that knowledge and perception are qualities (which are called mental qualities) that occur to man’s mind (and the soul), while if the essence of an external object enters the mind, it is necessary for it to turn into a mental quality, and the changing of essence into accident is impossible.[2]

Second, when we gain the knowledge of a thing in terms of its quantity or other accidents (except for its quality) and internalize it, we have, in fact, transformed it into a mental quality. However, as we know, according to philosophical-logical definitions and data, the ten-fold categories (Aristotelian categories) are completely different from each other in essence and quiddity, and can never turn into each other. Some Muslim philosophers and theologians tried to respond to this objection through resorting to false justifications, and some others, due to not knowing the answer, completely denied the issue of mental existence. However, to solve the problem, Mulla Sadra propounded one of his philosophical masterpieces which could also be employed in solving other related philosophical intricacies. Therefore, the issue of mental existence can be considered as one of the innovations of Mulla Sadra’s school of thought.

To disentangle this problem, Mulla Sadra resorted to logic and started analyzing ‘predication’ in propositions. Normally, when a predicate is predicated on and attributed to a subject, it is intended to demonstrate or express the existence of the predicate in the subject. Generally speaking, this could be true only when the predicate embodies existence, and the subject is an extension for it, as in the proposition, ‘Man is greedy’.

Mulla Sadra maintains: “There is another kind of predication which can be found in propositions such as ‘Man is a species’. Here, the intention is to state the identity between the subject and the predicate; that is, referring to the unity of two apparently different quiddities. This kind of predication is called haml-i awwali / dhati  (primary and essential predication), since it is only true about essences, and since it is ‘primary in truth /or falsity, and the proposition given in the previous paragraph is called haml-i shay’a-i sana’i (prevalent technical predication).[3]

The other important logical point which Mulla Sadra has referred to in the same place is that logicians commonly believe that for the realization of the ‘contradiction’ relation between two things, it is necessary to observe unity in eight conditions (subject, predicate, place, time, potency and act, general and particular, condition, and relation). Nevertheless, he adds a ninth condition and states that for contradiction to be realized, in addition to unity in the above-mentioned conditions, unity in predication is also necessary. In other words, both of them should be of the type of either common or primary essential predication; otherwise, there would be no contradiction.

He solved the problem of mental existence in the same way and said that when the external essence or quality (or any other accident) occurs to the mind and develops mental existence (and is, in fact, denied external existence), we can conceive of two different kinds of predication: 1. This mental existence is conceptually and essentially in unity with the external existent in terms of quiddity and, as a result, is predicated on it through the so-called haml-i awwali (primary and essential predication); 2. However, when we examine its status and existence in the mind, we see that it is a ‘mental quality’, and, therefore, of the type of the so-called haml-i shay’a-i sana’i (prevalent predication, since we are, in fact, faced with its existentiality. When we imagine an essence or accident in the outside, we attend to its external effect; nevertheless, when the external effect is negated, i.e., when it enters the mind, it is only a quality, and this is the key to solving the problem.

Mulla Sadra uses the word ‘particular’ in his example: The proposition, ‘The particular is not applicable to multiple things’, must be viewed in two ways: 1) since in practice and in the outside, the particular is not the universal, it is an extension for the label ‘particular’. However, as in the above proposition the word ‘particular’ is considered to include all the particulars of the world, it is a universal (an extension for universal) and by no means a particular (in other words, it is a universal existentially and practically, but a particular conceptually and essentially).

Thus the ‘particular’ is, in a sense, not universal and an opposite for it, 2) in another sense, it is a universal, including numerous extensions. However, there is no contrast between these two propositions: ‘particular is particular’ and ‘particular is universal’, since one is of the type of primary essential predication, and the other of the type of prevalent technical predication.

Concerning the problem of mental existence, it should be said that all the essences and accidents that occur to the mind are mental qualities, since their existence in the mind is realized through prevalent technical predication. Yet, comparing to each other, they are either the external concept of essence or an accident which is predicable to it (through primary essential predication). Moreover, essence is the same essence and accident which exist in the world.

2. Unity of the Intellect, Intelligible, and Intelligent

This issue partly pertains to the relation between man and his knowledge. Mulla Sadra’s epistemology has been scatteredly discussed amid the different parts of his philosophy, and, in every part, one of its dimensions has been introduced. In his tackling of this issue, Mulla Sadra responds to the following questions:

1. Is our knowledge separate from us and only a mirror-like reflection of external objects in our mind and senses?

2. Is the way knowledge reaches man similar to the pouring of something into an empty container, and their relation like the one between the container and the content, or is it a function of man’s mind (and soul) and its effect?

As we know, there are several ideas about knowledge in preceding and modern philosophical schools in the West which suffer from certain shortcomings and are not supported by any logical arguments. However, to demonstrate the essential relation between knowledge, the knower, and the known, Mulla Sadra has presented a number of rational arguments.

In the light of his theory, and on the basis of a series of philosophical arguments, Mulla Sadra proves that the perceiver, the mentally perceived object, and knowledge, itself, are the same and one. As he, himself, says, ‘the intellect, the intelligent, and the intelligible’, or ‘knowledge, the knower, and the directly known (subject)’ are in unity with each other. This issue is known as the ‘unity of the intellect, intelligent, and intelligible’.

It should also be added that, here, by the perceived object (or the intelligible), he means the same form which has been produced in man’s mind, which is technically referred to as the directly known (subject), rather than the external object which is called the indirectly known (fact / object).

 The issue of the unity of the intelligent and intelligible is basically related to the unity of the knower or the perceiver (the knowing agent) with the directly known, i.e., the same mental existent and the same intelligible and known in man’s mind, rather than its external existence. This is because it is a certain fact that objects never enter our mind exactly as they are through our perception and knowledge of them.

Philosophers’ disagreements in this regard center around the question of whether the picture-like quiddity of objects in the mind (the so-called directly known by each individual in the process of perception) is in unity with his intellect and soul or not.

If the answer to the above question is positive, knowledge, the knower, and the known, all, refer to the same reality, and analyzing this reality into three different things is only the product of man’s mental power. In other words, the relation among them is of the type of the one between the creator and the created, rather than the one between the container and the contained.

*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *

This issue has a long historical record, and we might be able to find its roots in Ancient Iranian philosophy.[4] It has been said that it was Porphyry (232-304 A.D), Plotinus’s student, who for the first time wrote a book in this regard, and that is why this issue has become famous in his name. Before Mulla Sadra, no one had posed any argument for it, or, at least, we do not know of any.

Ibn-Sina and a group of Peripatetic philosophers did not agree with this theory, since, in their opinion, there was no rational and demonstrative method for proving it. At last, Mulla Sadra found it of interest, started studying it, and in the course of a revelation he received during his period of ascetic practices in the suburbs of Qum (in 1037 A.H, when he was 58 years old), he found the related arguments and, following a philosophical approach, proved his theory.

In addition to an extensive explanation of this issue in his al-Asfar, Mulla Sadra has also dealt with it in some of his other books, and written an independent treatise on it. Obviously, the philosophical demonstration of this old and obsolete theory was of high importance to him, and we might even say that it was the most important theme in his epistemology, since he conceives of his success in demonstrating this issue as a miracle, the result of the direct assistance he received from God and the Holy Lady (M’asumah, the daughter of the 6^th leader of Shi’ites, who has a shrine in Qum in her name), and the fruit of his ascetic practices, worships, and lamentations in God’s Presence.[5]

*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *

Mulla Sadra’s arguments concerning this issue have been based on his other principles, the most important of which perhaps include ‘the principiality of existence’, ‘the trans-substantial motion’, ‘soul’s creativity’, ‘gradation of existence’, and ‘the difference between primary and prevalent predications’. In order to understand Mulla Sadra’s arguments in this regard, one should first perceive the meaning of ‘unity’ (ittihad). Obviously, unity in the sense of having two different existents, objects, concepts, or quiddities become one is impossible and absurd. Clearly, two separate things or two contradictory concepts are always two things and will never become one. This is the same objection than Ibn-Sina and others advanced against this issue, because they assumed that the unity between the intelligent and the intelligible is of this type.

Moreover, the meanings of ‘perception’ and ‘knowledge’ or rationalization need to be clarified here. The perception of things means ‘presence’, and presence means the ‘existence’, rather than appearance, of that thing before the perceiver, since ‘presence’ is other than appearance.

Now the question is whether the ‘existence’ of each ‘form’ of the perceived object is separate and independent from the ‘existence’ of the perceiver (or the intelligent), or in unity with it and has come into existence through that existence.

The answer to the above question is that if the existence of each were different from the other, each of the two had to be conceivable without the other (while it is impossible to have perception without a perceiver or a perceiver without perception). Accordingly, perception and the ‘form’ that is perceived and enters the mind are not anything other than the mind and the soul, so that they would have to appear before it. Rather, they are a part of it, and are made by the mind itself; they are the same as the existence of the soul and have presence for it. Again, it is emphasized that there is a difference between ‘presence’ and ‘appearance’.[6]

*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *

Another argument here is that there is a mutual relation between the perceived object and the perceiver, which is technically referred to as correlation. Related examples include the relation between a child and his father, the owner and his property, or a husband and wife.

This mutual relation, at all times and in all cases, makes it necessary for one side to come into existence or be assumed if the other side is in existence or is assumed; in other words, their separation from each other is impossible. According to Islamic philosophy, two correlatives are identical and commensurate in terms of their existence, non-existence, and potency and act.

Therefore, if there is a perceiver, there is also a perceived, and it is absurd for one of them to exist actually while the other is non-existent. Besides, since this relation is merely an ‘existential relation’, it is absurd for it to involve more than the existence of one of the two. Thus, since the relation between the perceiver and the perceived is of the type of correlation, both of them have the same existence.

*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *

Let’s review this argument once more: As mentioned previously, perception means the presence and existence of the ‘form’ of the perceived object, and there exists nothing like ‘perception’ in separation from the form of the perceived object in the mind (unless we separate them from each other through mental analysis). ‘Perception’ and ‘the perceived’ or the cognitive form are two different things in concept, but the same thing in existence. That is,

Perception (Knowledge or Intellection)↔ Known and the Perceived (Directly Known 

 

 

On the other hand, ‘perception is the act (or passivity) of the perceiver; no act is ever separable from its agent, and their existences are the same as each other. In fact, the existence of acts or passivity in man is no different from the existence of the agent or the patient.

Thus the existence of the perceiver (the knower or the intelligent) is not separate from the existence of his knowledge and intelligence, and both of them exist through one ‘existence’, i.e., they are in unity. Accordingly, wherever there is knowledge, there is inevitably a knower, too, and both are interdependent and correlative, so that if the existence of the knower fades away, there would remain no existence for the perceived, either. Thus,

Perception (Knowledge or Intellection)↔ Perceiver (Intelligent or Knower)

 

 

 

 

 

A combination of the above two relations leads us to the conclusion that the knower and the known (and knowledge) exist through one existence, and are in unity with each other. Therefore:

Perceiver↔ Perceived

 

 

 

 

 

Clearly, what is intended by the perceived is its mental concept and quiddity rather than its external equivalent.

*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *

There are certain subtleties in knowledge that require profound analysis and careful treatment, and cannot be discovered through the simplistic approaches that some philosophers might follow. Pre-Sadrian philosophers viewed knowledge and its consequences as accidents that occur to the mind (or the soul) exactly in the same way that dust covers the surface of a table.

Mulla Sadra rejected this idea, since he believed that, firstly, the soul is creative and can negate external existence to quiddities existing in the outside, create them exactly as they are in itself, and grant them mental existence.

Secondly, ‘the form of knowledge’, i.e., the knowledge whose form is made in the mind, like any form (as in Aristotelian philosophy), requires matter (hyle), and the matter of the form of the mind and knowledge is the very human soul. In fact, man’s knowledge or intellection is a part of his identity (a part of his soul) and develops his existence.

According to Peripatetics, matter or hyle is a potency for the ‘form’, and form plays the role of the cause for the hyle. Hyle and the faculty of the soul, through receiving or creating certain forms of perception and knowledge, grant actuality to themselves and, as a result, grow more, and with every step they take towards intellection and perception, they come one step closer to perfection.

In other words, man’s soul is a like a tabula rasa (while tablet) which is the same as pure potency: the more its intellect (and intelligible), which is created (and caused) by itself, the more its actuality, and the higher its perfection.

Pre-Sadrian philosophers believed that the relation between knowledge and intelligibles, on the one hand, and the soul, on the other, is like the relation between the container and the contained (and its secondary perfection)[7]; however, Mulla Sadra proved that the intellect and intelligibles of the soul are the product of its own endeavors, as well as the developmental motion of man’s existence, and that with every bit of knowledge that is gained, something is added to man’s existence (and the primary perfection[8] of the soul); it is more like adding a brick to a building in its process of completion, rather than splashing some paint on it or filling a container with its content.

The more knowledge reaches man’s soul, the grosser and the more perfect his existence. Thus man’s knowledge (and perception which is the introduction to knowledge) is a part of his existence, rather than one of the accidents that might occur to him.

3. Man’s Perceptions

Perception has always been, and still is, one of the themes raising a great amount of commotion in philosophical discussions. Mulla Sadra has a particular theory in this regard, too, and it seems to be more accurate and comprehensive than the ideas of other philosophers.

He accepts philosophers’ classification of perception into sense, imaginal, rational, and estimative perceptions.[9] However, he does not agree with the way they qualify them, and, ultimately, maintains that perception is of three types: sense perception, imaginal perception, and rational perception.

Mulla Sadra believes that the origin of all perceptions is the external object, which, immediately after entering the mind, obtains some degree of immateriality. He adds that, basically, all human perceptions are immaterial, and do not depend on a specific matter in the brain or the body for their existence, since matter, which is essentially followed by the trans-substantial motion, and its every moment is separate from the other, has no self-awareness, much less to be aware of another existent.

The mind, which, according to some philosophers, is like a receptacle for knowledge, is nothing other than the very perceptions and pieces of knowledge that man’s soul creates through its specific power of creativity.

We discussed imaginal perception previously in an independent section, thus in what follows, we will deal with the other two types of perception, namely, sense and rational perceptions.

Sense perception

Mulla Sadra believes that sense perception has different stages:

First stage: This stage consists of the reflection of external facts by the five senses. He conceives of this stage as the effect and reflection of an image on a photography negative, and maintains that it is too imperfect and low to be called perception and result in knowledge for man. This stage consists of a series of code-like signals that create a faint picture in the brain (and in early philosophers’ words, in the common sense).

This stage is only halfway through perception, and empiricists, who equate reflection on the senses with perception, have sufficed to half of what really takes place, and, thus, they cannot deny the complete process of perception.

Second stage: At this stage, it is the human soul’s turn to gain knowledge from these images and codes. Here, two important elements are necessary for sense perception: ‘attention’ and ‘awareness’. Attention is a psychological phenomenon, and has nothing to do with the body. Unless the soul’s attention is completely focused on the functions of the five senses, none of the signals transmitted by them can be regarded as perception.

We have also seen in practice that man, while crossing the street, does not perceive all the things his senses (such as sight and hearing) experience, unless he pays attention to them.

‘Attention’ is also a psychological phenomenon, out of the realms of the body and the brain. Attention is the result of man’s ‘attention’ to those things which have ‘presence’ for him. Awareness is the very presence of external objects in man’s mind (and soul). Mulla Sadra calls this attention and awareness of the soul as ‘presential knowledge’.

In Islamic philosophy, knowledge and perception are divided into two groups: acquired knowledge and presential knowledge.

‘Acquired knowledge’ consists of what is acquired through the five senses. It can introduce and present the quiddity (rather than existence) of objects to the mind. In Islamic philosophy, the cognitive form that is created in the mind is called the ‘indirectly known’.

As to his acquired knowledge, man is never confronted with the ‘existence’ of perceived things, because, as mentioned in the part related to mental existence, external existence cannot enter the mind without declining to the degree of mental existence, and is, in fact, not perceptible (that is why we perceive the fire, but its existential features, i.e., warmth, do not come to the mind). In acquired knowledge, man only deals with the ‘quiddity’ of objects; hence, his knowledge of phenomena lacks their characteristics and effects, and is useless.

‘Presential knowledge’ is, however, a direct kind of knowledge, needless of the mediation of the senses, and is interpreted as ‘intuition’. This knowledge involves the characteristics of the perceived existent. When a person looks at objects with his inward intuition, it is as if his ‘self’ has turned into the ‘self of the perceived object’, and the separation of the agent of perception and the object, as well as the distance between them, will not be sensed.

Sometimes, we perceive our own existence without the interference of our senses, and all our perceptions, including our feelings, desires, thoughts, internal motivations, affections, and perceptions, and psychological acts are in the form of presential knowledge. It is at this point that we reach the third stage of sense perception.

Third stage: This is the important stage of sense perception after the soul’s ‘attention’ to and presential knowledge of the signals transmitted from the five senses. Here, the soul, through its power of creativity,[10] and through making a model of those signals, reconstructs the ‘quiddity’ of the perceived object for itself, and substitutes it for the quiddity of that external existent. And as we know, the quiddity of every object consists of the totality of its reality, of course, without the existential effects of its external characteristics.

Accordingly, man’s perception is not in the form of the indwelling and presence of the form of external objects in the mind; rather, it is a kind of ‘creation’ that is manifested in the form of ‘emanation’ from the soul. Besides, all the previous stages of perception consist of, in fact, a series of peripheral and marginal contributions or so-called prerequisites, rather than true reasons. Therefore, knowledge cannot be separated from the knower (the unity of the knower and knowledge).

The important point in such an interpretation of sense perception is solving the problem of the correspondence of the perceived external object with perception or knowledge (subject), which is technically called the correspondence between the directly known and the indirectly known. This point is at the center of philosophy, and is considered as the basis of all sciences.

The solution to the problem of the correspondence between the outside and knowledge, or between the truth of knowledge and perception lies in the unity of the quiddity of the directly known object and the perception of the indirectly known or the subject. Mulla Sadra believes that a perception which fails to unveil the truth does not result in knowledge acquisition. Quiddity is the very external and objective reality of objects which has taken off the dress of external existence, and put on the dress of mental existence. And since the criteria for ‘unveiling’ is the very quiddity of objects, i.e., its limits and definitions, whenever we have access to the quiddity of something through acquired knowledge, we have gained the knowledge of that thing. All the primary and secondary qualities, quantities, attributes, and states of objects could be found in their quiddity, and perceived by means of the senses.

Mulla Sadra does not deny the error of the senses; however, he believes that what is known as the error of the senses is, in fact, an error in making correspondences and judgments. He maintains that man’s estimative faculty interferes with his judgments, and leads him towards committing errors. Error is an exceptional issue with respect to people suffering from mental diseases, and does not damage the universal principle of the truth of perceptions.

 

 Intellectual perception means the presence of the universal form of any intelligible before the mind (and wisdom).

‘Intelligible’, which is what man’s mind and soul perceive universally (abstractly and free from any relation) is divided into three groups: ‘primary intelligibles’, ‘secondary philosophical intelligibles’, and ‘secondary logical intelligibles’.

Primary intelligibles consist of those universal principles and known facts which are abstracted and inferred from external objects and phenomena, such as the principles of natural sciences, physics, chemistry, and the like. Aristotelian intelligibles are of this type.

Primary intelligibles are those universal forms and issues that man abstracts from particulars, such as individuals and objects. When studying these intelligibles and universal concepts, we sometimes encounter certain common universal issues among them. For example, they are either a cause or an effect; either one or multiple; either potential or actual. Moreover, they might consist of those universal attributes that qualify the objects out of the mind. Such secondary universals are called secondary philosophical intelligibles.

There are also some other secondary intelligibles whose receptacle of qualification is the mind, such as universal abstraction and being particular, which are called secondary logical intelligibles. There is a linear relation or connection among these perceptions, including sense and intellectual perceptions, and its degrees could be assimilated to the degrees of water temperature. The degrees of this line are different from the fixed degrees on a ruler, and, in fact, they represent a kind of fluctuation in mental and psychological acts that indicates the soul’s descent and ascend. Such intelligibles have been explained and demonstrated in a number of philosophical books.

3. Immaterial Imagination

According to common people, imagination means a series of free and sometimes baseless images which have no share of reality. Psychology views imagination as a phenomenon or force in humans that can freely create some objects or scenes that, like dreams, occupy man’s mind.

Peripatetic philosophers considered imagination as one of man’s internal faculties and powers. For them, his external perceptions were obtained through the five senses, and his internal perceptions included common sense,[11] imagination, imaginal memory (conceptual intellect), and faculty of the estimate. They also held that imagination was the vault of those forms which entered the mind through common sense, and memory was the reservoir of concepts and meanings. At the same time, imagination was equipped with another faculty which could synthesize the received forms and pictures at free will like an experienced director, and the faculty of estimate could construct the concepts as it wished. For Peripatetics, all these faculties dealt with particulars, and it was only the faculty of the intellect that dealt with universals.

Suhrawardi, the spokesman of Illuminationist philosophy, claimed that imagination had a receptacle other than man, consisting of an intermediate world (purgatory) between the world of the sense and matter and the world of intellects. He called this the world of Ideas or disjunctive imagination. The world of Ideas is stronger and more important than the material life, and weaker and lower than the world of intelligibles and intellects. According to his Illuminationist theory, all immaterial and beyond-sense forms come into existence in the world of imagination and Ideas. In this world, there is no trace of matter, but objects enjoy form and quantity there inside and resemble the things we see in our dreams without using the outward eye.

Peripatetic philosophers believed in the existence of two worlds for man: world of sensibles and world of intelligibles. However, Suhrawardi said that there existed three worlds, and added the world of Imagination to the two stated previously. This was the very limited world of Ideas, which Ibn-Arabi has sometimes referred to as the world of imagination. This world provides the basis for his worldview.

Mulla Sadra, too, believes in the three-fold worlds. He agrees with Peripatetics and other philosophers concerning the world of intelligibles, and with Suhrawardi and Ibn-Arabi concerning the world of imagination or Ideas. In his books, he refers to imagination as one of man’s internal perceptions; nevertheless, he disagrees with these two schools in certain respects:

First, unlike Peripatetics, who did not believe in the immateriality of imagination, he considers it, like the faculty of the intellect, as being separate from man’s organs (Peripatetics had assigned to it a specific place in the structure of the brain)[12] and as possessing the characteristics of abstract things. Of course, Peripatetics’ belief in the immateriality of the faculty of the intellect, and Mulla Sadra’s belief in the immateriality of the faculties of the intellect and imagination are both based on accepting and believing in the philosophical immateriality of the soul which philosophers had demonstrated through their arguments.

Although imagination is a psychological phenomenon in man, in Mulla Sadra’s view, it is neither in the imaginal faculty nor in the brain; rather, it is a creation of the soul and depends on the immaterial aspects of man’s soul.[13] 

Second, in contrast to Illuminationists, Mulla Sadra maintains that imagination exists in man and in the soul, and is dependent on it, rather than in the external world depending on itself. Illuminationists called this type of imagination Idea or disjunctive imagination; accordingly, Sadrian imagination has been called conjunctive imagination.

Mulla Sadra considers all types of man’s perceptions as the acts of the soul (not affections) for which the senses and other perceptive faculties function as tools. As the soul is immaterial, all its particular and universal perceptions are immaterial and needless of the body. Through his faculty of imagination, even without copying from the data of the senses, man can create forms which resemble God’s innovative creation (creation from non-existence)[14] in every respect.

According to the theory of the true three-fold worlds, i.e., the worlds of sense, Ideas, and intelligibles, which Mulla Sadra also agrees with, and on the basis of the principle of the correspondence between man’s internal three-fold perceptive faculties, i.e., sense, imaginal, and intellectual perceptions, and the above three-fold worlds, he believes that man’s soul enters the world of the sense through the perception of sensibles, the world of Ideas through imaginal perception, and the world of intellects through the perception of universals and intelligibles.[15]

In Mulla Sadra’s view, imaginal forms are of two types: 1) those forms which are received even without employing the content of the mind and memory, through the reflection of the beyond-sense realities on the mirror of man’s soul, or through the coordination and resonance of man’s soul (microcosm) or macro-anthropo (macro-cosmos); 2) those forms which take control through man’s faculty of imagination, and, by means of a skillful synthesis of some of the forms recorded in the mind, construct new forms, such as a winged-horse or a gold mountain.

Perhaps the origin of Mulla Sadra’s opposition to Suhrawardi’s theory of disjunctive imagination is the existence of this second group of low-value imaginal forms to which Mulla Sadra assigns no place in the disjunctive world of Ideas.

 

 

    

     Note:

. Vol. 1, Introduction.

• Due to conservation of essences and the impossibility of categories’ transforming into each other.
• [3]. al-Asfar, vol. 1, p. 292, Mustafawi Publications.
• [4]. Mulla Sadra, Treatise on the Unity of the Intellect, Intelligent, and Intelligible, Direct reference has been made to this point at the end of the first essay of this treatise.
• [5]. al-Asfar, vol. 3. p. 313, Tehran.
• [6]. This difference is the same as the one between nomen and phenomenon.
• [7]. Final entelechy.
• [8]. First entelechy.
• . In his books, Mulla Sadra expresses his doubts about estimative perception, and equates it with imagination.
• The issue of creativity has been extensively discussed in Islamic gnosis and Mulla Sadra’s school of thought, , as illustrated in the part on mental existence. For more information, refer to the article written by Seyyed Muhammed Khamenei, ‘Creativity and Man’s Vicegerency’.
• . Sensus Communis in Latin.
• At the end of the hole, the front part of the brain.
• This is because, like the body, the soul possesses certain senses such as sight (insight). Man can experience it and gain certainty about its reality when dreaming or dying.
• . Al-Mabda’ wal-ma’ad, vol. 2, p. 647, Mulla Sadra Philosophy Foundation Publications. Al-Asfar, vol. 8. p. 234.
•  

ontology in Shadra and Ibnu Arabi View

Ontology in Shadra and Ibnu Arabi View

By Nano Warno

Ontology is coming from the reality it self

in Fact, the discourse about existence in Islam is about the most reality and concrete one. it was non abstract and transcendent issue alone, it was also discussion about our live, daily live and all problematic which we face every day. Therefore, it is not true a claim that islamic philosophy not concern so much with reality as it is. Although it is need a deep reflection to bring form metapysic realm to physic actifity. In this regard is not amazing if ontology in islam especially in philosophy is cornerstone for Shadra philosophical tradition.

Despite that, it is more interesting and amazing to talk about this issue, wether if we speak in relating on Shadra and Ibnu Arabi view. Both of prominent thinker may be suppoused or assumed as a snow mountain which undiscovered of all their element of thought. And evidently Shadra and Ibnu Arabi keen to talking about existence (wujud).

In history Peripatetic and illuminativ and Ibnu Arabi perspective have form Shadra thought. albeit, he is independen and have autonomous field of philosophy. So any one who like to understand hikmah muta’liyah (trascendetal philosophy) should to be familiar with his predesecor such Ibnu Sina, Syuhrawardi and Ibnu arabi. last but not least it will be suggest to read more carrefully Ibnu Sina treatise, and for information Ibnu Sina acknowledged have make solution to 28.000 philosophical issues which can not be handle by Aristotle which written in his lost book ‘al-Inshaf.’

In shadra terminology a term existence or wujud is equivalent to reality. if we consider our body, our body exist in a room and a room exist in building and building exist in world and world exist in his existence. Any how despite being is  self-evident or axiomatic proposition in concept but in the reality (hakikat) is no easy to grasp.

As indicated below that existence Shadra as cornerstone for his Hikmah Muta’liyah, however yes view of Shadra on being or existence a precise and masterfull system based on the principle of primacy of existence over quiddity. Mulla shadra utilizes this background to unite a rational analytical thought with our direct experience of truht. as stated by Reza Akbarian Modares that  Shadra present this unity in a clear , systematic manner to transform his own metaphysics from Aristotelian philosophy to a philosophy which is essentially non-Aristotelian .

In early, we should distinguish between the reality of exsitence and the concept of existence, cause any one may enter to dispute and misunderstanding about each of them.

Shadra himself said :

The issue of existence is the foundation of theosophical and the groundwork for divine issues and tawhid (Allah’s oneness), eschatology and the ressurection of the body and the soul and othe issues which i have personally followed. and which prior to me, no one had dealt with . All of these issues revolve around the reality of existence.

It was very obvious and undoubtedly,  any one who like to study Shadra philosophy have to master more profoundly this term.

And the analysis of Mulla Shadra on the question of existence differs from Ibnu Sina. because Ibnu Sina remained faihtful to Aristotelian metaphysic whose primary and direct concern is the existence and which consider existence as a secondary issue. and Ibnu Sina believed that existence is a metaphysical element different from quiddity. And it should be noted in relating discussing the basic principles of hikmat as understood and expounded by Mulla Shadra, there are four topics in each of which Mulla Shadra has departed from earlier philosophical perspectives and which form the principles of his whole intellectual vision. these four themes are (1) being and its degradation (2) substantial motion or the becoming and change of the substance of the world (3) knowledge and the relation between knower and known and (4) the soul,its faculties, generation, perfection and final resurrection .

Shadra believe that being is the same reality in all realms of existence; it is a single reality but with gradation and degrees of intensity. We may look at the light of sun, the light of lamp, the light of candle all of the is light it self not something else. Same subject but with different predicates, as just as we indicate in issue of being, the being of God, of a man, of a tree, are all of being, or one reality but various intensity.

And being no matter where it manifest it self appear always with its attributes or armies (asakir) as they are traditionally called, such as knowledge, will, power etc. A stone, because it exist, is a manifestation of Being and, therefore has knowledge, will, power and intelligence like men or angels.

According Dr Jonathan Dolhenty :  We form the general concept of being by looking at the things around us. They are things of being. All things have a common element; they are existable. This means they are either actually in existence or could be in existence (possible existence).

In this sense, Shadra in another point different form this as he claim that concept being is self-evident we no need to looking around us  but by looking to our side (inside).

The next Shadra span it to gradation of being. Being with his unique  as mental  concept is like etre, has, and is in other language, but as external thing is similar to reality is self.

Ontology shadra really is not easy to grasp, need a intellectual an spirituali capasity. But any how and any studen who like to discover whole of horizone of his notion of being shoule be focus, do hard study and be familiar with his background intellectuality and his predecessor.

Shadra elaborate his notion on being, in different angle, aspect and real. So likewise in the beginning try to convince that a being in concept or concept of being is self-evident, clear to anyone, no need reflection and deep thinking and is not contrary that in level of haqiqat (the truth, the real, extention,mishdaq) the similar issues was very dificult. Futhemore we should aware such level. And mainly Mulla Shadra likewise any other philosopher along with other philosopher utilize tools of mantiq, like : mafhum and misdaq (concept and extention), haml (atributte), hamli syayi’ (predicat from concept to extention), jauhar and ardh (substantion and non essential) and so on. Therefor, it is must be accepted that any studen who love to study of Treatise Mulla Shadra should be familiar with this technical term.

Relating to conception in islamic philosophy we must distinguish first intelligible conception, scondary philosopical intelligible and scondary logical intelligible. Such existens  is realy a scondary philosopical intelligible.

After that, Shadra catch our attention to a equivocal and univocal term, this is also no easy to understand.

So, with this principle is not easy to imagine and how powerful his idea of ontology and as , since because the foundational of philosophic science for all metaphysic thought is called ontology, however study of being in its most general and widest aspects. And perhaps it was the core of his idea.

So in Shadra view the term being itself is applied for all of existence, in meaning not in word, this which call the univocal term.

This like shir in Persian language which can applied to lion, onion, milk, and so on.  In this aspect shadra try to undermine world (lafz) rather than meaning. So meaning is likewise that being or existence was universal (kulliy) that applied to his particular things.  And  but any how according to his successor and learner such distinguishting  must be comprehend more accurately, because by this we will fully understand the next his analyses.  Indeed it represent the basis of all metaphysical thought. 

And Shadra also emphasize a series of any ideas outcome from being, and with his respect such simplicity of being, property of being, comprehension or connotation and denotation or extention.

Fortunately, there are many literature which can help us to understanding Shadra philosophical easier  wrote by modern Islamic scholar such Alamah Thabathabai, misbah yazdi,  DR. Shirwani, DR. Mahdi Muhaqiq. DR. Fazlul Rahman and the other thinkers. Even by virtue their books – which in addition his technical term- bring us to discover whole of important things – which so difficult to a beginners.

Being if we accept as his core of ides shadra. Consequently we will find a basic formula for whole of his ideas and if not so    

Doctrine of The Unity and gradation of Being in Ibnu Arabi and Mulla Shadra thought

Since last years ago, Mulla Shadra and Ibnu Arabi has attrack me more than any other philospher and theosopher. I read what i search in my own spiritual and philosopichal journey. In Shadra treatise,   my rationality develop increasingly and within Ibnu Arabi my intuition become sharp trough in lowest degree. Futhermore I certain believe that  study each of them will gain more broader vision about islamic knowledge in multilevel dimension.

In addition, comparative study Ibnu Arabi and Shadra may not limitation on ontologi alone, there are some issue may drawn to be in this case, such ‘awalim (alam-alam, cosmology), perfect man (insan kamil), hermenetic and et cetera.

Ibnu Arabi hold that God as think him self, so in this appereance He love to be known in this level called  `ahadiyah` level, from `ahadiyah` spread a `al-Wahidiyah` and latter come ‘the Names` (Asma) and from The Names emerge permenen entity, which after that produces a low manifestaion in creation levels. It must be admiteed to analyse a manifestation (tajjali ) of Ibnu Arabi doctrin is not si simple.

The fundamental of Ibnu Arabi principle is being which is one or single reality and gradation of plurality is names (asma), attribute (shifat) and action (af’al), namely non essential things (umurun I’tibari) and his emanation of lord (syi’aat faydh): Qaysari as Fushusul Hikam  commentator said,  for Ibnu Arabi, wujud which qua being was not universal (kully) and nor particular (juz’i), not general term (am) and specific term (khas). All this term only for its manifestations

 

Wiliam Chitick in this regard said, Ibnu al-Arabi is known as the founder of  the school of the Oneness of Being (wahdat al-wujud). Though he does not employ the term. The idea permeates his works. Simply, stated, there is only one Being, and all existence is nothing but the manifestation our outward radiance of that One Being. Hence “everything” other than that One Being- that is, the whole cosmos in all its spatial and temporal extension- is nonexistent in itself, though it may be considered to exist through Being.

 

And DR Utsman Yahya in his preface for Tajalliyah Ilahi said  for ibnu Arabi manifestations of being in general is common for Hadzarat (His presentations) is three : (1) Tajalliyyat hadzarat dzatiyah, (2) Tajaliyyat fi Hadzrat Sifatiyah and (3) Tajalliyyat in Hadzrat Af’al.

 

The first is entification of The Real (ta’ayunat Haq) for Himself, formless called ‘ahadiyat’. The scond his entification of The Real (ta’ayunnat haq) for Him self but in perfect form of Names, which called ‘wahidiyah’ realm and The third  ta’ayunnat Haq (The Real entif ication)  by Him self form Himself  in exsternal form, or The Real manifest in real things

 

According to Ibn arabi in ‘Fushus al-Hikam’ those manifestation occur in alam tasyri’I ( tasyri’ realm)  not takwini which embodied in  Adam, Syits, Nuh, Musa and so on.  In other name ‘ahadiyat,’ ‘wahidiyah,’ is ekspression for tajaliyat wujud

According to Ibnu arabi whole of realm ‘malakuti’,   ‘jabarrut’ and ‘nasut’ and mitsal was manifestation or  theopany  of being this category mitsal is khiyal munfashil.

 

However, it mus be acknowledged that language of Ibnu Arabi is not easy to understand. His writing more times is so difficult, full of paradox expression,  and full of complicated remark, in his eloquence style it show a kind of contradictory  each  other and it was not problem for student alone but also for the expert as well. Anyone who engage in this field  will admitted it.              

 

Shadra say that the reality

 

In his Mabda wa Maad Mulla Shadra says :

 

And being do not differ in their essence except in intensity and weakness, perfection and imperfection, priority and posteriority. Being accidentally differs because of those notions that are subordinate to them, i.e. their different natures.

 

So in Shadra being it may be a potentiality, actuality, matter, spiritual, and similirary to Ibnu Arabi being it may be ahadiyah maqam, wahidiyah maqam, Names (asma), and Nature.    

  

In different way Ibnu Arabi begin to magnify God  and He is single being and alone which other take his emanation From God, meanwhile Shadra start from existence but in have in common with different angle. Shadra also stress on unique and absolute and most highly being or may called first being and prima cause.  

 

According to what was said earlier, the difference among beings is the difference in levels and degrees of existence.

Reflection on the reality of being leads to the conclusions that apart from self-necessary being which itself is the reality of being and the peak of the hierarchy of being,other levels of being have no reality other than belonging and relation to self-necessary being. Any thing apart from the divine essence is nothing other than relational and belonging to Him.    

 

In summary Shadra and ibnu Arabi talking about being with different angle, perspective and analysis.  Different background and starting point in consequently make influence to their approach. It was interesting although Shadra was disciple of Ibnu Arabi but in he had develop his thought at certain in sense might be a skeletal bone of Ibnu Arabi Mystic Philosophy. Ibnu arabi  expression is rather speculation style mixed with rational elaboration but not so deep in this regard Shadra came to fill this gap. Being in Ibnu Arabi writing is another label for God Himself except in levels  and since beginning with believing that non reality is nothing to compare with God.                 

 

 

Reference :

1. an Article from History of Muslim philosophy

2. Paper of Reza Akbarian on existence of Mulla Shadra

3. Bidayah and Nihayah al-Hikmah by  Alamah Thabathabai

 

4. Tamhidul hikmah by DR  Ali Syirawani

 

5. Ishtilahat Mulla Shadra

 

6. Fushus al-Hikamm by Ibnu Arabi

 

7. Syarh Fushusul Hikam, Qaysari

 

8. Sufi Path by Wiliam Chitich

 

9. Sufy Heritage, a collection of sufi writing 

 

 

ontology

in Fact, the discourse about existence in islam is discourse about reality and concrete one. it was non abstract and transcendetal, it was discuscion about our live, daily live and all problematic which we face every day. Therefore, it is not true a claim that islamic philosophy not concern so much with reality as it is. Ontology in islam especially in philosophy is cornerstone for shadra philosophical tradition.

Despite that, really is more interesting and amazing to talk about

Scepticism Hume

Hume Scepticism

The philosophical subjects of metaphysics and epistemology would be substantially different than they are today if there had been no David Hume .

Hume had awakened Immanuel Kant from his “dogmatic slumbers

The passion for philosophy…may only serve…to foster a predominant inclination…of the natural temper….There is, however one species of philosophy which seems little liable to this inconvenience, and that because it strikes … no disorderly passion of the human mind, nor can mingle itself with any natural affection or propensity; and that is the Academic or sceptical philosophy….It is surprising, therefore, that this philosophy, which in almost every instance must be harmless and innocent, should be the subject of so much groundless reproach and blame.
-David Hume, Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding

The worst speculative Sceptic ever I knew, was a much better Man than the best superstitious Devotee & Bigot.
-David Hume (Letter to Gilbert Elliot of Minto, March 10, 1751)